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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

:

RAYMOND GLEN DODGE,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20061101-CA

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant appeals from two convictions of distribution of a controlled substance and
one conviction of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, all in drug
free zones and enhanced to first degree felonies. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a) (West
2004). Jurisdiction is conferred pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)G) (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
ISSUE 1. Was defendant's trial counsel ineffective for introducing evidence that
defendant personally consumed drugs to support the defense that the drugs found in
defendant's possession were for his own consumption and not intended for distribution to
others; and did the trial court plainly err in admitting this evidence?
STANDARDS OF REVIEW. For the first time on appeal, defendant challenges his
trial counsel's strategic decision to introduce evidence that defendant personally consumed

drugs. See Brief of Appellant [Br.Aplt], Points I and III, at 14-22 & 28-34. Defendant
claims that the trial court plainly erred and also asserts that his counsel was ineffective.
Normally, when an issue is not raised in the trial court, appellate consideration of its
merits is waived unless the appellant establishes plain error or exceptional circumstances.
State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, \ 14, 128 P.3d 1171; State v. King, 2006 UT 3, \ 13,131 P.3d
202. To establish plain error, an appellant must show that (1) trial error occurred (2) which
should have been obvious to the trial court and (3) prejudiced the outcome of the trial. State
v.Dunn, 850P.2d 1201,1209 (Utah 1993). Exceptional circumstances arise only in the most
unusual circumstances, when rare procedural anomalies exist. Id. at 1209 n.3. Neither
exception applies, however, if appellant's trial counsel invited the error, that is, if "counsel,
either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the [trial] court that he or she had no
objection to the [proceedings]." Winfield, 2006 UT 4, \ 14.
Nevertheless, counsel's actions that invited the alleged error may be reviewed under
the rubric of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 114, ^f 21 n.2, 61
P.3d 1062. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant must show that (1)
his trial counsel's strategic decision was deficient and (2) prejudiced the outcome of the trial.
See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1225. Ineffective assistance of counsel raised for the first time on
appeal differs from the plain error and exceptional circumstances exceptions in that the latter
exceptions permit appellate review of a claim of trial court error, while the former
constitutional claim permits review of a claim of attorney error.

2

In this case, the invited error doctrine precludes review of defendant's claim of trial
error. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1220. Only the merits of defendant's claim of attorney error
may be considered.
ISSUE 2. Was defendant's trial counsel ineffective when he chose not to call John
Empey, a confidential informant, or Robert Farrell, defendant's co-conspirator, as witnesses
and did not object to police testimony recounting Empey's and Farrell's out-of-court
statements concerning their arrangements of the drug sales; and did the trial court plainly err
in allowing the witnesses not to be called or in admitting their out-of-court statements?
STANDARDS OF REVIEW. Defendant nominally claims a confrontation claim was
preserved below, but then analyzes the issue under plain error and ineffective assistance of
counsel. See BrAplt., Points II & III, at 22-34. See standards, supra.
ISSUE 3. Has defendant established a basis to apply the cumulative error doctrine?
STANDARD OF REVIEW. Defendant argues reversal is mandated under the
cumulative error doctrine. See BrAplt, Point IV, at 35-37. The doctrine permits reversal
of a conviction when multiple errors have "the cumulative effect" of undermining confidence
that a "fair trial was had." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1229.
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following provisions are reproduced in the Addendum, together with any other
statutes, rules, or provisions discussed in argument:
U.S. Const, amend VI;
Rule 801, Utah Rules of Evidence.
3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with three inter-related drug offenses in a single information
(R. 1 -2). Count I charged distribution of a controlled substance (heroin) on March 16,2006,
in a drug free zone, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (West 2004) (id.).
Count II charged possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance (heroin) on May
17, 2006, in a drug free zone, in violation of section 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (id.). Count III
charged distribution of a controlled substance (heroin) on May 17, in a drug free zone, in
violation of section 58-37-8(1 )(a)(ii) (id.). All charges were first-degree felonies (id.)
A two-day jury trial commenced on November 13, 2006, and resulted in guilty
verdicts as charged (R. 82-91). Defendant was sentenced to three terms of five-years-to-life
imprisonment. The terms imposed for the May 17th crimes (Counts II and III) were ordered
to run concurrently to each other, but consecutively to the term imposed for the March 16th
crime (Count I) (R. 91-92; Rl 18: 71-75). Defendant timely appealed to the Utah Supreme
Court, which transferred the matter to this Court (R. 95, 115).
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
Trust is necessary to purchase illegal drugs (Rl 17:102). Dealers will usually not sell
drugs to individuals they do not know. Consequently, a potential buyer must personally
know a dealer or must be introduced to a dealer by someone the dealer trusts (Rl 17:101 -02).

defendant claims he was prejudiced by the admission of certain evidence. This
Statement does not include the challenged evidence, but recites only facts unchallenged
on appeal in the light most favorable to the jury verdicts.
4

The Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike Force frequently makes undercover purchases
of illegal drugs by using known drug users to gain access to drug dealers (id). Two types
of go-betweens are used: (1) a "confidential" informant who knowingly agrees to help the
police in return for some benefit and (2) an "unwitting" informant who is unaware that he
is assisting an undercover police investigation (R117: 98, 101-02, 123, 129, 165-66). In
either case, the go-between's own drug dealer is often the target (Rl 17: 101-02).
The Strike Force typically pay their confidential informants $100.00 for each
completed drug purchase (R117: 100-01, 107, 155, 181).

A purchase arranged by a

confidential informant is deemed a "controlled buy" because it occurs under police directive
and the informant is not criminally liable for his participation (Rl 17: 102, 104-07, 155).
To initiate a controlled buy, the Force directs the confidential informant to contact the
targeted dealer to arrange a drug purchase and monitors the telephone call as it is made
(Rl 17: 106-07). The Force records the serial numbers of the purchase money and searches
the confidential informant to ensure that he has no drugs or unaccounted-for money on his
person (Rl 17:107-09). An undercover officer, posing as the informant's friend or associate,
typically accompanies the confidential informant to the arranged site, meets the targeted
dealer, and witnesses or participates in the drug purchase (Rl 17: 102-16).
Other Strike Force officers provide protection for the undercover officer and
informant during a controlled buy (Rl 17: 111-13). The surveillance team surreptitiously
positions itself at the pre-arranged site prior to the sale and visually monitors the transaction
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(id.). The team may also audibly monitor the transaction if the undercover officer is wired
for sound (id). The surveillance team may arrest the dealer following a successful buy or
may delay arrest if the undercover investigation is continuing (Rl 17: 119).
A different scenario occurs when the go-between is an unwitting informant. Because
an unwitting informant does not know that he is assisting the police, he usually sets up the
drug purchase independently of the police and may only inform the undercover officer of the
arrangements minutes before the buy is to occur. The surveillance team must then quickly
position itself to monitor the transaction (Rl 17: 166-69). Because an unwitting informant
is a co-conspirator of the targeted dealer, he is criminally liable for his participation in the
illegal drug sale (Rl 17: 182, 201).
In the present case, both types of informants were used to arrange drug buys from
defendant. The first buy occurred on March 16, 2006, using John Empey as a confidential
informant (Rl 17: 127-29). The second buy occurred two months later, on May 17, 2006,
using Empey minimally, but primarily relying on Robert Farrell, an "unwitting" informant
(Rl 17: 163-65). By the time of defendant's trial, Farrell had pled guilty and was imprisoned
for his participation in the May 17 drug sale (Rl 17: 182). Empey was also incarcerated, but
not in connection with this case (R117: 99, 152).
March 16 Drug Sale
Strike Force Officer Todd Watanabe knew John Empey was a drug user who regularly
purchased drugs (Rl 17: 98, 102, 123). Watanabe agreed to pay Empey $100.00 for every
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completed purchase of heroin, methamphetamine, or cocaine Empey arranged for the Force
and agreed to keep Empey's cooperation confidential (R117: 100-01). In all, Empey
participated in 20 controlled buys from various individuals (Rl 17: 181).
On March 16, 2006, Empey, working with Watanabe and Undercover Officer
Brandon Beck, arranged a controlled buy (Rl 17: 100-02, 105-06,130-31). Before the buy,
Empey was searched by the police, Beck was wired for sound, and money for the purchase
was secured from police funds (Rl 17: 104-09). Beck and Empey then drove to the parking
lot of Stimson's, a local store, where the surveillance team was already in position (Rl 17:
111-15, 131, 134). As Beck drove into the parking lot, defendant was standing outside his
car. Beck pulled up next to defendant and the three men got into defendant's car (Rl 17:
115,135-36). Empey and defendant sat in the front seat; Beck sat in the back, positioned so
he "could look right between" Empey and defendant and observe their hands (Rl 17:137-3 8).
As soon as the three were seated in the car, Empey turned back towards Beck. Beck
then handed Empey a $100.00 bill, which Empey immediately handed to defendant (Rl 17:
138). Defendant took the money, reached into his pants pocket, pulled out five small baggies
of heroin, and handed the heroin to Empey (Rl 17: 117, 138-39). Empey kept the heroin
exposed, "cupped" in his hands, as he handed the drugs to Beck (Rl 17: 138-39).
Beck asked defendant if the heroin was "good stuff (Rl 17: 140). Defendant replied
that "he's never had a complaint, but he doesn't use" drugs (id.). Beck asked if, in the future,
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he could buy more drugs from defendant. Defendant said he would first need "to do his
homework" on Beck and then told Beck to leave (Rl 17: 140-41).
Beck and Empey got back into Beck's car and drove away (Rl 17:141-42). Defendant
was allowed to leave without being arrested because the undercover investigation was
continuing (Rl 17: 119-20). Two months passed before the Strike Force again purchased
heroin from defendant.
May 17 Drug Sale and Possession
On May 17, 2006, Empey introduced Undercover Officer Brian Schultz to Robert
Farrell under the ruse that Schultz wanted to buy drugs (Rl 17:188-90). Farrell was unaware
that Schultz was a police officer and agreed to arrange a sale (Rl 17: 166, 191).
Officer Schultz drove Farrell and Empey to Ogden to purchase the drugs (Rl 17: 19192). In Ogden, Farrell twice got out of Schultz's car to make telephone calls (id.). After
Farrell returned to the car, Schultz drove to a Stop & Shop convenience store (Rl 17: 194).
En route, Schultz handed Empey a pre-recorded $ 100.00 bill and Empey immediately handed
the money to Farrell (Rl 17: 180, 192-98). Schultz then dropped Farrell off across the street
from the Stop & Shop. Farrell walked towards the front of the store. When Schultz could no
longer see Farrell, he and Empey drove away because the Strike Force did not want Empey
present if Farrell was arrested (Rl 17: 197, 201).
Schultz had surreptitiously notified the surveillance team of their destination. By the
time Schultz reached the Stop & Shop, the surveillance team was in position. The team
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watched Farrell get out of Schultz's car, cross the street to the front of the store, and meet
defendant (Rl 17:194-95,198-200,205-12,223; Rl 18: 9). The team watched as Farrell and
defendant then moved behind pallets in front of the store. It appeared that the two men were
trying to conceal themselves, but the surveillance team could still see them and could clearly
observe their hands (R117: 212-13, 223-26, 231-32; R118: 9-12, 17-18).
Farrell and defendant stood close together, while continuously looking back over their
shoulders (id). Defendant reached into his shirt pocket and retrieved something which he
handed to Farrell (id.). Farrell took the object and "pulled something out of his pocket and
handed it to" defendant (id.). The two then walked down the street in the same direction.
The surveillance team followed (id.). Defendant walked into a nearby Shopko and was
immediately arrested by a surveillance team member (R117: 213, 226-27; Rl 18: 12-13).
Farrell was arrested as he walked towards a nearby restaurant (Rl 17: 214).
Defendant and Farrell were searched (Rl 17: 215-16). The Strike Force found five
baggies of heroin on Farrell, which were packaged identically to the five baggies of heroin
Beck purchased from defendant in March (R117: 215-16). The Strike Force found an
additional 6.1 grams of heroin on defendant, which was six times the amount of heroin found
on Farrell or sold to Beck and equaled enough heroin for thirty to forty-five average drug
uses (Rl 17: 184-86,228-30; Rl 18: 20-26). The $100 bill Schultz had given Farrell minutes
before was inside defendant's wallet (Rl 17: 180; Rl 18: 15, 60, 64-65).
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The jury subsequently convicted defendant of selling heroin to Beck in March (Count
I), of selling heroin to Schultz via Farrell in May (Count III), and of possessing with intent
to distribute the 6.1 grams of heroin found on defendant at the time of his arrest (Count II).
The jury also found that the offenses occurred in drug-free zones (R. 86-89; Rl 17: 67-68).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
For the first time on appeal, defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for
introducing evidence of defendant's long-time drug use, for not calling John Empey and
Robert Farrell as witnesses, and for not objecting to police testimony recounting Empey's
and Farrell's out-of-court statements. Defendant also asserts that the trial court plainly erred
when it failed to override defense counsel's strategic decisions and allowed in this evidence.
Because defense counsel invited the errors defendant now alleges, defendant is precluded
from claiming that the trial court plainly erred. Instead, defendant must proceed under the
rubric of ineffective assistance of counsel. Based on these facts, defendant cannot establish
attorney error, to wit, that his counsel's strategic choices were deficit and prejudicial.
Therefore, his ineffectiveness claims fail.
POINT I: Introduction ofDefendant's Drug Use. Defendant asserts that his counsel
was ineffective for introducing evidence of defendant's personal drug consumption because
drug addiction is not a defense to distribution (Counts I & III). Drug consumption, however,
may be a defense to possession with intent to distribute (Count II).
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A charge of possession with intent to distribute requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that (1) the defendant knowingly possessed drugs with (2) the intent to distribute them
to others. In this case, defendant never disputed that he knowingly possessed the 6.1 grams
of heroin found on him at the time of his arrest. Only his intent was at issue.
The prosecutor presented strong evidence establishing that defendant possessed the
heroin with the requisite intent to distribute it. Nevertheless, evidence that defendant
personally consumed large amounts of drugs might have eroded this proof. Defense counsel,
therefore, legitimately chose to portray defendant as a long-time drug user, who might
possess a large amount of heroin solely for his own consumption. Moreover, whether
counsel's choice was legitimate or not, admission of this evidence did not prejudice
defendant; it only made his involvement in drug distribution more understandable.
POINT II: Failure to Call Empey and Farrell as Witnesses and Failure to Object
to Their Out-of-Court Statements. Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in not having
Empey and Farrell testify, but also admits that any error was invited by defense counsel.
Consequently, he claims that defense counsel erred in not calling Empey and Farrell as
witnesses and in not objecting to the admission of their out-of-court statements. According
to defendant, his counsel's failures violated his right of confrontation and prejudiced the
outcome of his trial. Because the issue is inadequately briefed, this Court may summarily
disregard it. Even if its merits are considered, defendant fails to establish that his counsel
was ineffective.
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Defendant admits that his trial counsel consciously chose not to call Empey and
Farrell as witnesses. Though he claims that choice was ineffective, he does not allege that
either, if they had testified, would have exculpated him or would have otherwise challenged
the prosecution's evidence. In sum, defendant fails to establish that his counsel's choice not
to call Empey or Farrell was deficient and prejudicial.
Similarly, defendant fails to establish that counsel's decision not to object to the
admission of their out-of-court statements was deficient and prejudicial. Here, Empey's and
Farrell's statements do not constitute "testimonial hearsay" and, therefore, do not implicate
the Confrontation Clause. The statements do not constitute hearsay because the statements
were not admitted for their truth, but only admitted to provide background and context to the
police officers' eyewitness accounts of the two drug sales. Farrell's statements are also not
testimonial in that they were unwittingly made by a co-conspirator during the commission
of a crime. Thus, objection would have been futile.
Moreover, no prejudice resulted from admission of the statements. The statements
did not establish any element of the charged crimes. Instead, defendant's guilt was
established by the police officers' eyewitness accounts and the physical evidence. Neither
the admission nor the sufficiency of this latter evidence is challenged on appeal.
POINT III: Cumulative Error. The cumulative error doctrine is not applicable in this
case because there are no multiple errors. Even if multiple errors were established, their
cumulative effect did not deprive defendant of a fair trial.
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ARGUMENT
POINTI
DEFENSE COUNSEL LEGITIMATELY INTRODUCED EVIDENCE
THAT DEFENDANT PERSONALLY CONSUMED DRUGS TO
UNDERMINE EVIDENCE THAT HE INTENDED TO DISTRIBUTE
THE DRUGS TO OTHERS; IN ANY CASE, EVIDENCE THAT
DEFENDANT USED DRUGS DID NOT UNFAIRLY TAINT
EVIDENCE THAT HE SOLD DRUGS
Defendant admits that he did not object below to the admission of evidence that he
personally consumed and was addicted to drugs. Indeed, he concedes that his trial counsel
actively sought the introduction of this evidence. See Brief of Appellant [Br.Aplt.] at 14,16,
19-20 & 31-32. Nevertheless, he claims for the first time on appeal that its admission was
erroneous and unfairly prejudiced the outcome of his trial. See Br.Aplt., Points I & III.
"Generally speaking, a timely and specific objection must be made [at trial] in order
to preserve an issue for appeal." State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, \ 14,128 P.3d 1171 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). When an appellant fails to object at trial, his claim
of error is considered waived. See State v. Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, ^f 31, 137 P.3d 716.
The preservation rule, however, has two exceptions: plain error and exceptional
circumstances. State v. King, 2006 UT 3, ^J13; 131 P.3d 202. To establish plain error, the
appellant must show "(I) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial
court; and (iii) the error is harmful." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208 (Utah 1993). The
exceptional circumstances exception "applies primarily to rare procedural anomalies." Id.
at 1209 n.3 (citing State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 926 (Utah App. 1991)).
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Accordingly, appellate courts employ this exception sparingly, "reserving it for the most
unusual circumstances where [the Court's] failure to consider an issue that was not properly
preserved for appeal would have resulted in manifest injustice." State v. Nelson-Waggoner,
2004 UT 29, \ 23, 94 P.3d 186. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
A litigant may go further than not preserving an error in the trial court; he may invite
it. "Under the doctrine of invited error, [this Court has] declined to engage in even plain
error review when [trial] counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the
[trial] court that he or she had no objection to the [proceedings]." Winfield, 2006 UT 4, \
14 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "[W]here invited error butts up against
manifest injustice [or plain error], the invited error rule prevails," State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d
1201, 1206 (Utah App. 1991).
"Of course, if [trial] counsel's decision in leading the [trial] court into error falls
below the standard of reasonable professional practice," the attorney's conduct may be
reviewed under the rubric of ineffective assistance of counsel. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1220. To
establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant must affirmatively "demonstrate,
' first, that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment and,
second, that counsel's performance prejudiced' him." Benvenuto v. State, 2007 UT 53, ^f
18, 165 P.3d 1195 (quoting Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988), and citing
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Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). Whether this burden has been met presents
a question of law. State v. Marble, 2007 UT App 82, f 7, 157 P.3d 371.
While some components of the plain error and exceptional circumstances exceptions
are similar to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the focus of their analysis differs
significantly. The plain error and exceptional circumstances exceptions permit appellate
review of an unpreserved claim of trial court error. In contrast, a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel permits review of a claim of attorney error.
(A) Herej Invited Error Precludes Plain Error Review, But Permits a Claim
of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel to Be Raised.
Defendant argues that the trial court plainly erred when it allowed the defense to
introduce evidence that defendant was a drug user without first conducting a prejudice
inquiry pursuant to rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. See Br.Aplt. at 14-22.
At the same time, defendant admits that his trial counsel affirmatively chose to
introduce this evidence and acknowledges that plain error review is precluded under the
invited error doctrine. See BrAplt. at 12-15, 20, 31-34. See also R117: 124-25, 144-48;
Rl 18: 16-17 (defense counsel's attempts to introduce evidence of defendant's drug use).
Though invited error precludes plain error review, see Perdue, 813 P.2d at 1206, defendant
may claim that his counsel was ineffective for inviting any error. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at
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1220. Consequently, defendant's claim of attorney error is fairly before the Court. See
Br.Aplt. at 31-34. Based on this record, however, the claim fails.2
(B) Defendant's Personal Consumption of Drugs Was a Defense to
Possession with Intent to Distribute (Count II) and, Therefore, His
Counsel's Strategic Choice to Introduce this Evidence was Reasonable.
"An attorney's performance is deficient if' counsel made errors so serious that counsel
was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.'"
Benvenuto, 2007 UT 53, ^f 19 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). "The seriousness of
those errors is measured by whether 'counsel's representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness.'" Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). "In making this
assessment, ca court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within

2

Though admitting that his claim was not preserved below and invited by counsel,
defendant suggests that a "hybrid situation" may exist here because the prosecutor
allegedly objected to the admission of the evidence. See Br.Aplt. at 15 (citing Rl 17:
146). The record does not support defendant's claim. SeeKill: 146 (reflectingthat
prosecutor objected to the form of a question defense counsel asked about what facts
might indicate personal drug use as opposed to an intent to distribute). But even if the
prosecutor had raised a rule 403 objection, a contention that evidence unfairly prejudices
the prosecution does not put a court on notice that evidence unfairly prejudices the
defense. Compare State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, If 24, 108 P.2d 730 (requiring a rule 403
inquiry when the prosecution introduces evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts to prove
identity, motive, or another proper non-character person pursuant to rule 404(b), Utah
Rules of Evidence), with State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1012 (Utah App. 1994)
(recognizing that "[a] defendant has a right to adduce evidence [of other crimes] that
would tend to disprove a specific intent to commit a crime").
Defendant also nominally refers to the exceptional circumstances exception. See
Br.Aplt. at 21. Because defendant asserts no "substantial... procedural anomaly" to
invoke the exception, see Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, \ 23, the State does not
address it. See State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, \ 13, 72 P.3d 138 (refusing to address
inadequately briefed issues).
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the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome
the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered
sound trial strategy."5 Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Moreover, because
"'[counsel's actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made
by the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant^ the] court must make 'every
effort... to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of
counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the
time.'" Id. at \ 20 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 & 691). See also Marble, 2007 UT
App 82, ^ 12 & 15 (holding that given the "'variety of circumstances faced by defense
counsel,' a conscious choice not to object to arguably inadmissible testimony may, at times,
fall within 'the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal
defendant'") (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Defense counsel's strategic choices will
not be rejected on appeal unless there exists '"no reasonable basis for them.'" State v. Leber,
2007 UT App 273, f 17, 584 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (quoting Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277,
282 (Utah 1995)).
Defendant argues that there was no reasonable basis to introduce evidence of his drug
use because drug addiction is not a defense to drug distribution (Counts I & III). See Br.Aplt.
at 16, 18 & 31. However, defendant's personal drug use tended to show that he lacked an
intent to distribute (Count II).
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Count II required the prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the 6.1
grams of heroin found on defendant at the time of his arrest were not for defendant's own
consumption, but intended for distribution to others. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(l)(a)(iii). See also State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782, 787 (Utah App. 1998), affirmed, 985
P.2d 911 (Utah 1999) (recognizing that possession with intent has two elements: that the
defendant (1) knowingly and intentionally possesses a controlled substance with (2) the
specific intent to distribute the substance to another); State v. Gurr, 904 P.2d 238,241 (Utah
App. 1995) (recognizing that all surrounding circumstances, and not just the quantity of
drugs possessed, is determinative of an intent to distribute).
In this case, strong evidence established the requisite intent to distribute. Officer
Watanabe testified that 6.1 grams of heroin would supply an "average" addict with 30-40
uses, depending "on the user and - and how addicted he is" (Rl 17: 186). It was also six
times more in weight than the heroin purchased by Undercover Officer Beck in March or
Farrell in May (R118: 20-26). These facts fairly support that 6.1 grams of heroin is more
than the amount expected to be possessed for personal consumption.

Additionally,

Undercover Officer Beck testified that defendant told him in March that he did not use drugs,
which would substantially negate that the heroin found on defendant in May was for his own
use (Rl 17: 140). And an intent to distribute the 6.1 grams of heroin could fairly be inferred
from the existence of the March and May sales. See Statement of Facts at 6-9. Given this
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evidence, conviction of Count II was ensured unless the defense raised a reasonable doubt
about defendant's intent to distribute.
Defense counsel legitimately chose to create that doubt by establishing that defendant
was a long-time heroin user, who could easily consume more than the "normal" amount of
heroin. See Olsen, 869 P.2d at 1012 (recognizing that "[a] defendant has a right to adduce
evidence [of other crimes] that would tend to disprove a specific intent to commit a crime").
At the same time, defense counsel did not want defendant to testify and face crossexamination on all three charges or possible exposure of his full drug history that dated back
to the 1950fs (Rl 18: 30-31, 72-73). Instead, counsel attempted to elicit evidence of
defendant's drug history from police officers who had known defendant for years (Rl 17:
124-25; Rl 18: 16-17). Counsel also attempted to elicit general information about addiction
from other officers based on their training and experience (R117: 144-48). When this
questioning failed to establish defendant's long-term history of addiction, defense counsel
chose to introduce a limited portion of defendant's criminal record—two convictions for drug
possession—to show that defendant had at times possessed drugs simply for his own use
(R117: 145, 154-55). Counsel was then able to argue that 6.1 grams of heroin was not
necessarily a large amount of heroin for defendant to possess or consume:
[Defense Counsel]: Thirty uses ain't that much for a junkie. If someone's
gonna use it 30 times, and you're [defendant's] age, 70 years old, 30 uses to
him, gees, he could probably do that in eight days. Three times a day.
Minimum. For him, that may have just been his week's supply. Who knows?
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(Rl 18: 54). In sum, defense counsel followed a classic defense to possession with intent to
distribute—when he could not deny defendant's possession, he denied defendant's intent.
See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 423 (1970) (recognizing that an intent to
distribute is not established when it is equally consistent that the drugs possessed are for
personal consumption); United States v. Kates, 174 F.3d 580, 582 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding
that while a quantity of drugs "too large to be used by the defendant alone" supports an intent
to distribute, an amount consistent with personal use does not absent other evidence); United
States v. Hunt, 129 F.3d 739,744 (5th Cir. 1997) (reversing a conviction for possession with
intent to distribute where the evidence was consistent with personal use despite the
defendant's prior denial that he used drugs).
Moreover, because the jury did not have the option of returning a verdict of simple
possession (R. 3-80), defendant would have been acquitted of Count II if the defense strategy
had worked. The fact that the strategy did not work does not diminish the reasonableness of
its choice. See State v. Kooyman, 2005 UT App 222, \ 43,112 P.3d 1252 (recognizing that
the ultimate success of a given trial strategy does not determine its reasonableness).
(C) Given the Limited Defenses to the Distribution Charges (Counts I & III),
Defense Counsel Reasonably Portrayed Defendant as an Addict to Make the
Defense's Other Claims More Credible and Gain the Sympathy of the Jury.
Evidence of defendant's drug use not only provided a viable defense to Count II, where
no defense otherwise existed, it also generally benefitted the defense of Counts I and III. See
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State v. Vos, 2007 UT App 215,114, 164 P.3d 1258 (recognizing that the reasonableness of
counsel's strategic choices is limited by the evidence in a given case).
The issue of personal drug use first emerged during voir dire and continued as a theme
throughout the trial. During jury selection, the court asked the venire members about their
exposure to illegal drugs (Rl 17: 31). Nineteen members had either personally used drugs or
had family members or close friends who had been involved with drugs (Rl 17:32-41). Many
felt that this experience might affect them and one felt the penalties for drug possession were
too harsh (id.). The prosecutor was then allowed to directly question the venire. The
prosecutor in a series of questions focused on the venire's attitudes towards drugs, drug users,
and drug dealers (Rl 17: 48-53). When one venire member repeated that he felt some drug
penalties might be too harsh, the prosecutor asked if he believed that the law should
differentiate between a drug user who sold drugs and a non-user who sold drugs (Rl 17:51).
The venire member said a non-drug-user who sold drugs as a business was worse (Rl 17:5152). The prosecutor then asked the entire venire if they agreed:
[Prosecutor]: Okay. Anybody else feel like it is, you know, all bets are off on
whether sentencing is too harsh if the person we're trying before you is charged
as a drug seller and not a drug user? Do you think that we should be less harsh
or more harsh on people that sell drugs only?
The Jury Panel: More.
[Prosecutor]: By show of hands on drug sellers rather than drug users.
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(Rl 17: 52).3 Subsequently, defense counsel asked a slightly different question:
[Defense Counsel]: Now, [the prosecutor] talked a lot about the difference
between a drug user and a drug dealer. Does anyone have a problem with
someone who is a drug user who also deals to support their habit? Is that
different than someone who just deals to make a profit?
(Rl 17: 62-63). Two venire members indicated that this could make a difference (id.).4
Defense counsel later objected to the prosecutor's voir dire questions about dealers
who were non-drug-users (R117: 76). The prosecutor revealed that he would introduce
evidence that defendant did not personally use drugs, but only sold drugs for profit (id). The
court noted that whether a dealer also uses drugs makes no legal difference, but ruled that the
prosecutor's voir dire inquiries were relevant based on the venire's expressed views and
experiences (R117: 76-77).
As promised, the prosecutor introduced evidence that defendant denied using drugs
(Rl 17: 140). Defense counsel attempted to neutralize the inference that defendant was the
worst type of dealer—a non-drug-user who dealt drugs purely for profit—by introducing
evidence and then arguing that the 70-year old defendant was sick from his own addiction and
needed help (Rl 17: 124-24, 144-48; Rl 18: 16-17,54-55).

3

The record suggests that multiple members of the panel responded, "more," but
does not indicate how many ultimately raised their hands (Rl 17: 52).
4

Both were subsequently removed: one for cause based on his views of the drug
laws and the second because defense counsel represented her son in a drug trial which
resulted in the son's conviction and imprisonment (Rl 17: 68).
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And though drug addiction is not a legal defense to distribution (Counts I & III),
introduction of this evidence nevertheless created a more favorable environment to argue that
reasonable doubt existed as to Count III, the May sale. Eyewitness testimony established that
Farrell and defendant exchanged something before both were arrested.

Immediately

thereafter, Farrell possessed five baggies of heroin, that were packaged identically to the five
baggies of heroin defendant sold Beck in March. Additionally, defendant had the $100 bill
that Undercover Officer Shultz had just given Farrell to buy heroin. See Statement of Facts,
supra.

Faced with this evidence, defense counsel argued that the money Farrell gave

defendant could have been for any number of innocent reasons; that no one saw defendant
give drugs to Farrell; and that Farrell may have possessed the five baggies of heroin before
he met defendant (Rl 18: 52-53). Evidence that defendant used drugs bolstered counsel's
argument regarding Count III because the defense also argued that the heroin
contemporaneously found on defendant was defendant's own stash and not the source of the
heroin found on Farrell (Rl 18: 54).
In closing, defense counsel returned to the theme that defendant's addiction was to be
more pitied than punished:
[Defense Counsel]:... And the State made a big deal when we're picking the
jury and we're doing this in opening argument that, hey, this isn't just a drug
user, this is a guy that's dealing drugs. Does it matter that he's having to sell
drugs to support his habit? Now they're saying the other side, you know what,
it doesn't really matter, he's still selling drugs, period.
Well, you know what, unfortunately, that's kind of what happens
sometimes. Doesn't make Ray a perfect individual. Means he's got a problem.
He's sick. He needs some help. Where he's gonna get that help, I don't know.
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My guess is, he'll get it from some institution somewhere, whether it be the
Weber County Jail or the Utah State Prison or Weber Human Services, he'll get
some help somewhere. Okay. But the fact is, he did something - or at least the
State says he did something, and then they're trying to convince you that this
guy's just a dealer. But his own record includes that he's also been convicted
ofpossession.
(R115: 55).
Though an appeal to sympathy is not a legal defense to distribution, it is a viable trial
strategy, especially when no other exists. The evidence establishing that defendant sold drugs
to Undercover Officer Beck in March (Count I) was overwhelming. See Statement of Facts
at 6-8. The evidence establishing that defendant sold drugs to Farrell in May (Count III) and
possessed 6.1 grams of heroin with the intent to distribute it (Count II) was very strong. See
id. at 8-9. Despite the low probability of success, defense counsel "attempted to make the best
of a bad situation, given his very limited options." See In reAlcox, 137 Cal.App.4th 657,669
(Cal. App. 2006). See also People v. Scott, 939 P.2d 354, 369-70 (Cal. 1997) (recognizing
that counsel may reasonably need to make difficult or unusual tactical decisions when faced
with little or no defense); People v. Ahl, 243 A.D.2d 985,987 (N.Y.A.D. 1997) (recognizing
that an appellate court must judge a claim of ineffectiveness from the "perspective" of the
"limited options" available to trial counsel). Here, the best option was to make his 70-yearold addicted client more sympathetic and, thus, any defenses to Counts II and III more
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credible.5 SeeAlcox, 137 Cal.App.4th at 668 ("It is not ineffective assistance of counsel for
counsel to admit obvious weaknesses in the defense case").
(D) In Any Case, Introduction of Defendant's Personal Drug Use Did Not
Prejudice the Outcome of this Multi-Charge Distribution Trial.
In any case, evidence of defendant's drug use did not prejudice the outcome of the trial.
See Benvenuto, 2007 UT 53, ^ 23 (reaffirming that "[e]ven if an attorney's performance was
deficient, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel will fail if counsel's deficiencies have
no effect on the outcome of the proceeding").
To meet the prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, an appellant
must affirmatively establish that "'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'" State v.
Templin, 805 P.2d 182,187 (Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694) (other citation
omitted). "In making this determination, an appellate court should consider the totality of the
evidence, taking into account such factors as whether the errors affect the entire evidentiary
picture or have an isolated effect and how strongly the verdict is supported by the record."
Id. at 187. "And as with the first prong of the Strickland standard, there is a 'strong
presumption' that the outcome of the particular proceeding is reliable." Benvenuto, 2007 UT
53, ^ 23 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 699).

5

There was no viable defense to Count I.
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As set forth in the Statement of Facts and discussed, supra, other unchallenged
evidence overwhelmingly established that defendant sold drugs to Beck in March (Count I).
Strong evidence also established that defendant sold drugs to Farrell in May (Count III), and
possessed with the intent to distribute 6.1 grams of heroin when arrested (Count II).
Consequently, evidence that defendant personally used the heroin he distributed did not
adversely impact the jury's determination—it only made his involvement in distribution more
understandable.
POINT II
DEFENSE COUNSEL LEGITIMATELY CHOSE NOT TO CALL
EMPEY OR FARRELL AS WITNESSES AND NOT TO OBJECT TO
THE ADMISSION OF THEIR OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS; AND
IN ANY CASE, NO PREJUDICE RESULTED
Defendant contends that his right to confrontation as guaranteed under the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution was violated when Empey and Farrell did not
testify and their out-of-court statements were admitted through others' testimony. See
Br.Aplt., Points II & III

Defendant admits, however, that it was his own counsel who

stipulated that Empey and Farrell need not be called by the prosecution, his own counsel who
affirmatively chose not to call Empey and Farrell as defense witnesses, and his own counsel
who did not object to the admission of Empey's or Farrell's out-of-court statements. See
Br.Aplt. at 28 & 32. Nevertheless, defendant suggests that a confrontation claim may have
been raised when defense counsel informed the trial court that defendant did not agree with
counsel's tactical decision not to call Empey and Farrell as witnesses. See Br.Aplt. at 28. At
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the same time, defendant admits "that, due to the wording of this objection, this issue also may
be considered invited error" and plain error review precluded. See id. Consequently,
defendant argues that his counsel's strategic choices not to call Empey and Farrell and not to
object to the admission of their statements were ineffective in that they resulted in the loss of
his right of confrontation. See Br.Aplt. at 2 & 28-35. Defendant's ineffectiveness claim fails.
(A) Defendant Did Not Preserve a Confrontation Claim Below and Invited
Error Precludes Plain Error Review on Appeal; But Defendant May Claim
that His Trial Counsel Was Ineffective.
Generally, when an issue is not preserved below, it may be considered on appeal only
if the defendant establishes plain error or otherwise raises a claim of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel. See discussion of standards at 13-15.
Here, the record reflects that while defendant may have disagreed with defense
counsel's strategic decision not to have Empey or Farrell testify, he did not object to the
admission of their out-of-court statements. Nor did the disagreement between counsel and
client preserve a confrontation claim. As will be explained, infra, the disagreement only
establishes that the errors defendant now alleges were invited and plain error review is
precluded. Thus, the issue is whether counsel was ineffective for making those choices.
Empey was a paid confidential informant who set up and participated in the March
drug sale and tricked his roommate, Farrell, intoassistingthepoliceinMay(R117: 101,12740, 165, 190-91). By the time of defendant's trial, Empey was incarcerated at the Utah State
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Prison for a parole violation unrelated to this case (Rl 17: 99). Farrell had pled guilty to
distribution in connection with the May sale and was incarcerated (Rl 17: 182).
At trial, Officer Watanabe recounted several out-of-court statements made to him by
Empey. Watanabe testified that Empey was a known drug user who told him that he wanted
to work as a confidential informant because he wanted to "get [drugs] off of the streets"
(R117: 100). Despite Empey's claimed altruistic motive, Watanabe classified him as a
"mercenary informant" and paid him $100 for each successful drug purchase he arranged
(R117: 100-01).
Watanabe testified that in March 2006, Empey told Watanabe that he could purchase
drugs from defendant (Rl 17: 97). Watanabe proceeded to organize an undercover controlled
buy which targeted defendant and used Officer Brandon Beck in an undercover capacity
(R117: 102-05).
Watanabe testified that he and other members of the Force listened to Empey as he
telephoned to set up the purchase (Rl 17: 105-06). After the call, Empey told Watanabe and
the other officers that he had spoken to defendant and that defendant wanted the sale to take
place at the parking lot of Stimson's, a local store (Rl 17: 106). Watanabe and the Strike
Force surveillance team followed Empey and Beck to Stimson's, where they saw and heard
(via Beck's audio wire) the two get out of Beck's car, meet defendant, who was waiting in the
parking lot, and the three men get into defendant's car (Rl 17: 111-15). Watanabe did not
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relate what occurred inside the car, but testified that a few minutes later, Beck and Empey got
back into Beck's car and drove away to meet Watanabe (Rl 17: 116).
Undercover Officer Brandon Beck next testified to his involvement in the March
heroin purchase (Count I). He also recounted several out-of-court statements made to him by
Empey. Beck explained that he needed someone like Empey to set up the purchase because
Beck could not directly deal with defendant (Rl 17: 127-29). Beck testified that he heard
Empey make the telephone call, after which Empey told Beck that he had spoken to defendant
and they were to meet him at Stimson's parking lot (Rl 17: 130-31). Beck drove Empey to
the parking lot and as they pulled in, Empey pointed to a man who was standing outside a
parked car and said, "There's Ray" (Rl 17: 131, 134-35). Beck pulled up next to the man,
who Beck identified as defendant, and Beck and Empey got out of Beck's car (R135-36).
Defendant, Empey, and Beck then got into defendant's car (Rl 17: 136).
Beck was in the backseat, but situated himself so he could clearly see both defendant
and Empey's hands and could hear anything they said to each other (Rl 17: 136-38). Empey
turned back towards Beck and asked for the drug purchase money (Rl 17:138). Beck handed
Empey $100, which Empey "right away" handed to defendant (Rl 17:138-39). Seconds after
defendant received the money, defendant handed five baggies of heroin to Empey, who
immediately handed the drugs to Beck (Rl 17: 138-40). Beck asked defendant if the heroin
was good and if Beck could purchase more in the future; defendant responded that he did not
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use drugs and he would need to check out Beck (Rl 17: 140-41). Beck and Empey left and
Beck turned over the heroin to Watanabe (Rl 17: 141-42).
No objections were raised when Watanabe and Beck testified to Empey's out-of-court
statements.
After both officers testified, the prosecutor approached the court outside the presence
of the jury. The prosecutor explained that even though Empey had previously indicated he
did not want to testify, he had been transported from the prison and was present at the
courthouse (Rl 17:152). The prosecutor had spoken to Empey, but he continued to refuse to
testify (id). Defense counsel agreed with the prosecutor's characterization.
[Defense Counsel]: I spoke to [Empey] as well, your honor, to see if he might
be willing to perhaps testify on behalf of Mr. Dodge. His words to me were he
wasn't going to testify for or against Ray Dodge. He just didn't want anything
to do with it. I think it's more of a safety issue than anything else.
(R117: 152).6

Both parties then stipulated that Empey could be released from the

prosecution's subpoena and returned to the prison (Rl 17: 152-53).
Defense counsel informed the court that he had discussed the matter with defendant,
who wanted to force Empey to testify:
[Defense Counsel]: . . .[defendant] is under the impression that he has a right
to face his accuser, and his accusers, in his mind, are Mr. Farrell and Mr.
Empey. In my mind, his accusers are the Weber County - Weber-Morgan
Strike Force. But just to make record of that particular issue, he believes he's

6

No one claimed that Empey feared defendant, only that Empey was incarcerated
and did not want to be labeled a snitch.
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not being allowed the right to face his accusers, being Mr. Empey and Mr.
Farrell.
(Rl 17: 153). The prosecutor agreed that the Strike Force officers were the witnesses who
would establish the requisite elements of the crime and, therefore, were defendant's
"accusers." Empey and Farrell were only incidental witnesses who brought the Strike Force
and defendant together (Rl 17: 153-54). The trial court agreed.
[The court]: I agree. Probably would be preferable if Mr. Empey would testify,
but his choosing not to puts the State actually at a disadvantage if he was going
to testify adverse to - to Mr. Dodge. And if they can prove their case without
[Empey], they're entitled to do so. And that's what we're here for, to see if the
jury will be persuaded, without the testimony of Mr. Empey, beyond a
reasonable doubt. So any motion is denied and you may proceed.
(Rl 17: 154). Neither defendant nor defense counsel raised further objection.
Officer Watanabe was then recalled by the prosecution to explain the circumstances
of the May buy (Count III) and defendant's arrest and possession of 6.1 grams of heroin
(Count II). Watanabe testified that Empey told him that he could no longer arrange sales from
defendant because defendant was upset that Empey brought Beck in March (R117: 165).
Watanabe further testified that on May 17, Empey called Watanabe and said his roommate,
Robert Farrell, could purchase heroin from defendant (R117: 165-67). Watanabe then
directed Empey to introduce Undercover Officer Shultz, posing as a potential buyer, to Farrell
(id). No objection was raised to this testimony.
Undercover Officer Schultz testified to what transpired next. Shultz testified that when
he and Empey met Farrell, Farrell agreed to purchase drugs for Schultz (R117: 188-91).
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Farrell told Schultz to drive to Ogden and then twice told Shultz to stop so he could telephone
the dealer, who Farrell said was defendant (Rl 17: 191-94). After the calls, Farrell directed
Schultz to drive to a Stop & Shop and told Schultz to stay in the car because defendant would
be nervous if Schultz accompanied him (R117: 192 & 197). No objection was raised to
Schultz's testimony.
Watanabe and other members of the surveillance team testified to what they observed
when Farrell and defendant met in front of the Stop & Shop and about their subsequent
arrests. See Statement of Facts at 8-9.
In sum, no confrontation objection was raised below. At best, defendant simply
disagreed with his counsel's decision not to force Empey and Farrell to testify.

But

defendant's desire to face Empey and Farrell, whom defendant described as his "accusers,"
was not based on the Confrontation Clause, but on defendant's sense ofjustice. As defendant
apparently saw it, two men he trusted had betrayed him. His apparent revenge was to force
them to testify because they feared for their safety if they did. See Homer v. Morris, 684 P.2d
64,68 (Utah 1984) (recognizing "the substantial risks that informers in prisons run when they
cooperate with [government] officials"). At the same time, defendant voiced no concern
about the admission of their out-of-court statements. Indeed, when defense counsel informed
the court of defendant's disagreement with his decision not to call Empey or Farrell, Empey's
out-of-court statements had already been admitted without objection. Likewise, Farrell's
statements were subsequently admitted without objection. Because no confrontation claim
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was preserved below and any errors invited, the issue on appeal is limited to ineffectiveness:
has defendant established that his counsel's strategic choices resulted in the loss of
defendant's right of confrontation and prejudiced the outcome of the trial?
(B) Defendant's Claim of Ineffectiveness is Not Adequately Briefed and
Should Be Summarily Rejected.
This Court has consistently required appellants to strictly comply with rule 24, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, If 13. Rule 24 requires appellants
to submit a brief containing "not just bald citation to authority but development of that
authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority." West Jordan City v. Goodman,
2006 UT 27, Tf 29, 135 P.3d 874 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "An issue
is inadequately briefed when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the
burden of research and argument to the reviewing court." Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, ^ 13.
When an appellant's brief "fails to cite relevant legal authority or provide any meaningful
analysis" regarding the issue presented, this Court has "routinely declined" to consider the
argument. State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, ^ 27, 989 P.2d 503 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Here, defendant has failed to comply with rule 24 in presenting his
ineffectiveness claim; therefore, the claim should be summarily rejected.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must affirmatively establish
that "his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner . .. [and]
that counsel's performance prejudiced him." Benvenuto, 2007 UT 53, \ 18 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). Here, defendant claims that his counsel's decision not to
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call Empey and Farrell as witnesses and not to object to the admission of their statements
resulted in the loss of his right of confrontation as articulated in Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36 (2004). See Br.Aplt. at 22-34. Thus, to succeed on his ineffectiveness claim,
defendant must establish the underlying confrontation violation and show how that violation
changed the outcome of the trial. Without a confrontation violation, defendant cannot
establish either prong of his ineffectiveness claim. See Marble, 2007 UT App 82, ^f 12
(reaffirming that proof of an ineffectiveness requires proof of a underlying prejudicial error).
Pursuant to the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, Crawford bars the
"admission of testimonial statements of a witness who [does] not appear at trial unless he was
unavailable to testify, and the defendant [had] a prior opportunity for cross-examination." 541
U.S. at 53-54. The Clause as interpreted by Crawford sots a constitutional restriction on when
one type of out-of-court statement—testimonial hearsay—may be admitted pursuant to
evidentiary rule if the declarant does not testify at trial. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct.
2266,2273 (2006). But neither Crawford nor tho Confrontation Clause demand that a witness
be called at trial. Nevertheless, defendant asserts that the failure to call a witness violates
confrontation.7 See Br.Aplt. at 23-25. Moreover, defendant does not analyze the impact of
invited error on his confrontation claim. See Salt Lake v. Williams, 2005 UT App 493, fflf

7

Defendant cites to Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) and State v. Moosman,
19A P.2d 474 (Utah 1990), whose confrontation analyses are necessarily modified by the
Supreme Court's more recent Crawford decision. But both cases—like
Crawford—address only the constitutional admissibility of a non-testifying declarant's
out-of-court statements. They do not require that a particular witness be called.
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28-29,128 P.3d 47 (holding that a confrontation claim may be waived if the alleged violation
was invited by defense counsel).
Similarly, defendant presumes that the admission of any out-of-court statement
necessarily implicates confrontation. See Br.Aplt. at 24-27. But neither Crawford nor the
Confrontation Clause bar the admission of all out-of-court statements. Crawford, 541 U.S.
at 51. For example, "[t]he Clause does not bar admission of a statement so long as the
declarant is present at trial to defend or explain" the out-of-court statement. Id. at 59 n.9. Nor
does the Clause "bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the
truth of the matter asserted." Id. Rather, Crawford deals "solely with the Confrontation
Clause implications of the admission of testimonial hearsay." State v. Henriod, 2006 UT 11,
U 17, 131 P.3d 232. Thus, whether an out-of-court statement is offered for its truth, is
testimonial, was subject to cross-examination, was made by a witness who testifies at trial or
by a witness who is legally unavailable are all critical factors in analyzing a Confrontation
Clause issue. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-80; Williams, 2005 UT App 493, fflf 11-25. A
defendant claiming a violation of the Confrontation Clause must demonstrate that: (1) the
challenged statement was offered for its truth, (2) the statement was testimonial, (3) the
statement's declarant did not appear at trial, (4) the declarant was not legally unavailable and
(5) the defendant had no prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. See id. Moreover,
if the alleged violation underlies an ineffectiveness claim, as it does here, the defendant must
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also establish that his counsel's failure to assert the confrontation claim was not only
unreasonable, but prejudiced the outcome of the trial. See Marble, 2007 UT App 82, \ 12.
Here, defendant has not addressed the Crawford factors nor applied them to his
Strickland claim.

Instead, he presumes without analysis that Empey's and FarrelPs

statements were offered for their truth. See Br.Aplt. at 23-32 (baldly asserting that all of
Empey's and FarrelPs statements constituted "hearsay"). He also asserts, without analysis,
that the statements are testimonial and constitutionally barred from admission under
Crawford. See Br.Aplt. at 27. With only minimal analysis, defendant then concludes that his
counsel was "oblivious to the issues . . . regarding hearsay and confrontation," "was not
cognizant of this area of the law," and, therefore, was ineffective. See Br.Aplt. at 32. He
claims prejudicial attorney error because "[virtually the entire substance of evidence
produced at trial was hearsay" and alleges that Empey was the only person to witness
defendant's crimes. See id. at 24. He also asserts that defense counsel had no opportunity to
show Empey's and FarrelPs biases or motives. See id. at 24-25. But as will be discussed, the
record does not support defendant's factual and legal assertions. Nor do such sweeping
generalities satisfy the thoughtful analysis required of Crawford and Strickland.
In sum, defendant's failure to adequately brief his ineffectiveness claim based on an
alleged confrontation violation justifies its summary rejection. See Goodman, 2006 UT 27,
f 29 ; Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, ^ 13. Alternatively, the claim lacks merit.
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(C) Defense Counsel Made a Reasonable Tactical Decision Not to Call
Empey or Farrell to Testify.
Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to call Empey or Farrell
as witnesses and for not objecting to the admission of their out-of-court statements.
Defendant claims that his counsel's failures violated his Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation and prejudiced the outcome of his trial. See Br.Aplt. at 22-35. Though he
nominally cites to the state confrontation provision, article 1, f 12 of the Utah Constitution,
he does not premise his ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the state constitution. See
State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, \ 16, 164 P.3d 397 (reaffirming that more than nominal
reference is necessary to present a state constitutional claim). Instead, defendant argues only
that counsel's alleged deficiencies violated his federal right to confrontation as set forth in
Crawford, 541 U.S. 36. See Br.Aplt. at 27 & 32.
As will be more fully discussed in the next subsection, Crawford focuses on when an
out-of-court statement offered for its truth may be admitted without violating the
Confrontation Clause. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-54; State v. Henriod, 2006 UT 11, Tj 17,
131 P.3d 232. It does not, however, compel that any witness be called to testify. Rather,
Crawford delineates only when a non-testifying declarant's out-of-court statements may be
constitutionally admitted. See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273.
Consequently, confrontation is not implicated in the first part of defendant's argument
on appeal: that his counsel was ineffective for failing to call Empey and Farrell as witnesses
and for stipulating to Empey's release from the prosecutor's subpoena. See Br.Aplt. at 2-3,
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23-27 & 31-34. Instead, defendant's insistence below that he wanted Empey and Farrell to
testify provides only the basis for a general claim of attorney error. See, e.g., Leber, 2007 UT
App 273, \ 19 (recognizing that the decision of what witnesses to call normally falls within
counsel's legitimate tactical decisions). Based on these facts, defendant's ineffectiveness
claim fails.
"In challenging counsel's effectiveness, 'a convicted defendant must identify the acts
or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional
judgment. The court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the
identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent
assistance.'" Benvenuto, 2007 UT 53, \ 20 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).

Of

course, counsel must at least explore "the possibility of procuring prospective defense
witnesses," before he can make a "reasonable decision to call or not to call particular
witnesses for tactical reasons." Templin, 805 P.2d at 188. Here, defense counsel reasonably
explored the possibility of Empey and Farrell testifying before he made the legitimate tactical
decision not to call them.
Empey worked as a paid confidential informant and successfully completed 20
controlled buys, only two of which involved defendant (R117: 100-01, 181). Though he
arranged and witnessed the March buy, his role included little more. See Statement of Facts
at 6-8. Empey's involvement in the May sale was even more minimal: he introduced
Undercover Officer Schultz to Farrell, but left before Farrell met defendant. See Statement
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ofFacts at 8-9. By the time of trial, Empey had his own problems. He was imprisoned on a
parole violation and did not want to testify for fear he would be labeled a snitch (Rl 17: 99,
152-53). Likewise, Farrell had pled guilty to his role in the May sale and was incarcerated
(Rl 17: 82). On this record, it appears that Farrell also did not want to testify for safety
reasons (Rl 17: 152-53; Rl 18: 53).
Defense counsel spoke with Empey and determined that his testimony would not help
the defense (Rl 17:152). Only at that point did defense counsel determine not to call Empey.
Similarly, defense counsel knew that Farrell had confessed to his role in the May sale and had
named his co-conspirator, the person who sold him the drugs (Rl 17: 82, 217). Though the
record does not indicate the person Farrell named, the record does not suggest—and defendant
does not claim—that it was anyone other than defendant.
Based on these facts, counsel's decision not to have Empey or Farrell testify was
reasonable. As the trial court noted, if Empey had testified, he was expected to testify
"against" defendant (Rl 17: 154). Likewise, if Farrell had testified, he presumptively would
have testified that he used Shultz's $100 to buy five baggies of heroin on May 17 at the Stop
& Shop. Neither testimony would have benefitted defendant. Instead, as defense counsel
recognized in closing, it was their absence which helped the defense:
[Defense Counsel]: No one's ever heard either one of the C.I.'s or the
confidential informant [Empey] or the unwitting [Farrell] have ever said that
Ray sold them drugs. Neither one of them ever testified. They never provided
a written statement of any kind. Sol want you to weigh that and decide, gees,
if they're not willing to come to court, how trustworthy are these two?
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(Rl 18: 54-55).
Nevertheless, for the first time on appeal, defendant speculates that if Empey and
Farrell had testified, defense counsel would have been able to "establish[] [their] biases,
inconsistencies, and possible ulterior motives" in arranging the sales. See Br.Aplt. at 24-25.
Defendant, however, points to no inconsistencies, biases, or ulterior motives not already
apparent on the face of the record.
The jury was aware of the biases and motives of Empey and Farrell. They knew
Empey was a drug user who offered to help the police for the community good ("to clear the
streets of drugs"), but was actually a "mercenary" who assisted them in return for money
(Rl 17: 100-01). They also knew that Empey betrayed not only defendant, who had trusted
him, but also his own roommate, Farrell (Rl 17: 165). At least one member of the jury was
puzzled by the risks Empey took for the $200 he earned from both sales and wondered if
Empey had faced incarceration in this case (R117: 155). Empey's motives were clarified for
the jury:
Mr. Empey had been released from prison [at the time of the charged sales] and
was not arrested on any of the underlying drug charges involved with this
defendant. He was doing it for the money. A hundred dollars [per successful
sale] was the going rate. He didn't have any other employment, and so he did
it. Now, it's up to him to keep his nose clean so he doesn't go to prison and get
himself in any kind of trouble. . . . He's down there [at the prison] for
something that has nothing to do with this.
(R117: 155-56).
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Similarly, the jury knew that Farrell, a drug user, had been tricked by his roommate
into assisting the police and ended up arrested, convicted, and incarcerated. In closing,
defense counsel told the jury, "And [Farrell] wasn't ever subpoenaed to testify and he
probably wouldn't have testified even if he had been subpoenaed, just like the other guy didn't
wanna testify because, gees, you know, I'm in prison. I don't wanna get my butt kicked for
nothing. And I can't say I blame him. So that's what we're dealing with on that" (Rl 18: 53).
In sum, defense counsel investigated the possibility of compelling Empey to testify and
reasonably determined no benefit would result. Counsel also knew that Farrell's testimony
would not aid the defense. The fact that defendant disagrees with his counsel's tactical
decisions does not establish their deficiency. See Leber, 2007 UT App 273, *f 19 (holding that
the failure to call an eyewitness who may have provided unfavorable testimony does not
constitute deficient performance). And in any case, as will be discussed, infra, no prejudice
resulted from Empey's and Farrell's absence from trial.
(D) Defense Counsel Reasonably Chose Not to Object to the Admission of
Empey's and Farrell's Out-of-court Statements Because Any Objection
Would Have Been Futile.
Defendant also claims that his counsel was ineffective when he failed to object when
Officers Watanabe, Beck, and Schultz testified to Empey's and Farrell's out-of-court
statements. According to defendant, his counsel's failure to object resulted in the loss of his
right of confrontation as articulated in Crawford. See Br.Aplt. at 26-27 & 32.
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As previously discussed, admission of an out-of-court statement is prohibited by the
Confrontation Clause if the statement (1) is offered for its truth, (2) is testimonial, and(3) was
made by a non-testifying declarant unless (4) the declarant is legally unavailable to testify and
(5) the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at
53-54. Here, defendant's argument that his counsel was deficient because he did not raise a
Crawford objection to Empey's andFarrell's statements fails for multiple reasons, which will
be fully discussed below. In sum, however, Empey's and Farrell's statements were not
offered for their truth and, therefore, did not constitute hearsay. Second, Farrell's statements
were statements of a co-conspirator and did not constitute hearsay and were not testimonial.
Third, Farrell's statements were also not testimonial because they were unwittingly made to
an undercover police officer. Because none of the statements constituted testimonial hearsay,
there admission was not barred by the Confrontation Clause or any evidentiary rule. Thus,
objection to their admission would have been futile and defendant's ineffectiveness claim
necessarily fails. See Kooyman, 2005 UT App 222, ^30 (reaffirming that "counsel's failure
to make motions or objections which would be futile if raised does not constitute ineffective
assistance" of counsel) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Universally, courts recognize that "if an out-of-court statement is 'offered simply to
prove that it was made, without regard to whether it is true, such testimony is not prescribed
by the hearsay rule.'" See Olsen, 869 P.2d at 335. See also Utah R. Evid. 801(c) (defining
"hearsay" as an out-of-court statement "offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
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asserted"). For example, statements made by a confidential informant to a police officer as
to the location of the defendant were not hearsay because they were "not admitted to prove
the truth of the information, but rather to explain the conduct of the police in setting up an
armed stakeout of the home where defendant was found." State v. Collier, 736 P.2d 231,233
(Utah 1987). Similarly, an unidentified citizen informant's statement to a police officer that
the defendant asked the citizen where he could buy cocaine because he wanted to kill himself
was not hearsay because it was "evidence of verbal acts" and not admitted for its "substantive
truth." Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360,365 (Utah App. 1992), affd, 875 P.2d 557 (Utah
1994). Nor were the statements of a rape victim and her sister made to a third-party deemed
hearsay when the statements were not offered to prove the fact of the rape, but only to "show
the chronology of events leading to the specific incidents at issue." State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d
1207,1211 (Utah App. 1991). For the same reason, a police officer may relate what another
person told him if it provides background and context to the police officer's subsequent
actions. Layton v. Noon, 736 P.2d 1035, 1039 (Utah App. 1987). Accord United States v.
Van Sack, 458 F.3d 694, 700-02 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that a conversation between a
confidential informant and the defendant was not hearsay because it only provided
background and context to the subsequent police actions), cert, denied, 111 S. Ct. 2158
(2007); State v. Leyva, 640 S.E.2d 394,398-99 (N.C. App. 2007) (same). In sum, statements
which only provide background and context do not constitute hearsay—and therefore do not
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implicate confrontation—because they are not admitted for their truth. See Davis, 126 S. Ct.
at 2273; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9.
Defendant fails to acknowledge this distinction. He presumes that Empey's and
Farrelrs statements constituted hearsay but does not address the truth requirement of
Crawford, rule 801(c), or the above-cited Utah authority. Instead, he simply asserts without
analysis that hearsay constituted "[virtually the entire substance of evidence produced at
trial." Br.Aplt. at 24. In his Statement of Facts, defendant identifies eight out-of-court
statements he claims violated his right of confrontation:
(1) "Officer Watanabe testified that the confidential informant [Empey] 'stated
that he could purchase heroin from Ray,9" see Br.Aplt. at 9 (citing Rl 17: 97);
(2) "[Watanabe] testified about the confidential informant's alleged [telephone]
conversation with the Defendant," see Br.Aplt. at 9 (citing Rl 17: 106);
(3) "Officer Watanabe listened to the conversation of the recording device [on
Officer Beck] and testified . . . regarding what occurred during the alleged
[March] transaction," see Br.Aplt. at 9 (citing Rl 17: 115);
(4) "Officer Beck also testified that he listened to the confidential informant's
side of a telephone conversation allegedly made with the Defendant, and
testified that the confidential informant informed him that the Defendant had
made the decision where the controlled drug purchase was to occur," see
Br.Aplt. At 10 (citing Rl 17: 130-31);
(5) "Officer Watanabe again testified regarding telephone conversation he
overheard involving John Empey. During this conversation Mr. Empey
apparently told the officer that he had arranged another drug deal," see Br.Aplt.
at 10-11 (citing Rl 17: 165);
(6) "Apparently John Empey had a conversation by phone with an individual
by the name of Robert Farrell. Again,... the officer testified as to the content
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of the conversation in which the second drug purchase was discussed," see
Br.Aplt. at 11 (citing Rl 17: 167);
(7) "One of these conversations resulted in the officer testifying that this
particular buy was to occur in the parking lot of Shopko [Stop & Shop]," see
Br.Aplt. at 11 (no record citation);
(8) "Officer Shultz then . . . offered hearsay testimony regarding the previous
buy although he was not involved in that purchase/' see Br.Aplt. at 11 (citing
R117: 190).
None of the identified statements were offered "to prove the truth of the matter asserted" and,
thus, they do not constitute hearsay and do not implicate confrontation. See Crawford, 541
U.S. at 59 n.9; Utah R. Evid. 801(c).
None of the statements described the crimes at issue. The statements only described
what Empey and Farrell did in setting up the drug sales. The statements also explained why
Beck went to Stimson's and approached defendant in the parking lot and why Schultz and the
surveillance team were at the Stop & Shop. But it was the police officers' eyewitness
accounts of what happened once they were at those locations that established the charged
crimes. See Statement of Facts at 6-9 (relating only the police eyewitness accounts of the
sales).
Defendant also asserts that Empey provided the only "unifying thread" in establishing
the two sales because the police only witnessed portions of each transaction. See Br.Aplt. at
24. This wholly ignores Officer's Beck eyewitness account of his essentially hand-to-hand
buy from defendant in March. See Statement ofFacts at 6-8. It also ignores that Empey left
the scene before the May sale occurred. See id. at 8-9. And while the surveillance officers
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could not see the object actually exchanged during the May sale, the officers' combined
testimony established that Farrell was given $100 in police money to buy heroin just before
he met defendant and that immediately after meeting defendant, Farrell possessed heroin
packaged identically to the heroin defendant sold in March and defendant now had the $ 100.
See id. at 8-9. None of this eyewitness and physical evidence involved Empey's or Farrell's
statements.
Likewise, Empey's statement that defendant no longer trusted him, but that his
roommate Farrell could buy from defendant was not offered for its truth, but to explain why
Officer Shultz drove Farrell to Ogden and gave him $100. Farrell's statements to Schultz
during the drive fall into the same category: they simply explained why Schultz and the
surveillance team were at the Stop and Shop. The truth of these statements was irrelevant,
however, because it was the surveillance team's eyewitness observations and seizure of the
physical evidence which established the May crimes.
In addition to not being hearsay, Farrell's statements were not testimonial and,
therefore, did not implicate confrontation. See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273 (recognizing that the
Confrontation Clause only bars testimonial hearsay); Williams, 2005 UT App 493, ^ft| 11-17
(same). Statements made unwittingly to a police officer are not testimonial. See Crawford,
541 U.S. at 58. Nor are statements made by a co-conspirator during the course of the crime.
Id. (citing Bowjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181-84 (1987) and holding that a coconspirator's statement made in the course of the conspiracy is neither hearsay nor
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testimonial). See also Utah R. Evid. 801 (d)(2)(E) (defining as non-hearsay a statement made
by a co-conspirator during the commission of the crime).
Here, Farrell was an unwitting informant who did know Schultz was a police officer.
See Statement of Facts at 8-9. Additionally, Farrell was defendant's accomplice and coconspirator. See State v. Pelton, 801 P.2d 184,185 (Utah App. 1990) (recognizing that "any
act in furtherance of arranging to distribute a controlled substance" constitutes distribution)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). Under either theory,
Farrell's statements to Schultz were not constitutionally barred or otherwise inadmissible. See
United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223,224-251 (2d Cir. 2004) (recognizing that the admission
of a co-conspirator's statement does not implicate confrontation or violate evidentiary rules);
United States v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 183 (3rd Cir. 2005) (recognizing that a statement
made unwittingly to the police does not implicate confrontation or violate evidentiary rules).
Accord United States v. Moneyham, 473 F.3d 280, 286 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Tolliver, 454 F.3d 660, 665 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Underwood, 446 F.3d 1340,
1345-47 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Ayala, 469 F.Supp.2d 357,361-62 (W.D. Va. 2007)
(same).8

8

Whether Empey's statements were testimonial is a closer question. See Williams,
2005 UT App 493, \ 17 & \ 18 n.4 (recognizing that statements may be testimonial if a
reasonable person would assume that the "statement might be used in the investigation or
prosecution of a crime," but not fully determining what constitutes a testimonial
statement); United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 670-71 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that a
confidential informant's statement to the police is testimonial and barred under Crawford
if offered for its truth). This issue need not be decided here because even if Empey's
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In sum, defendant has failed to establish that his counsel's decision not to object to
Empey's and Farreli's statements was deficient. Empey's statements were not offered for
their truth, but to provide context and background to the police testimony. Likewise, Farreli's
statements were not offered for their truth and, in any case, did not constitute testimonial
statements because he was an unwitting informant and defendant's co-conspirator. As such,
the admission of the statements did not offend the Confrontation Clause,
(E) In Any Case, No Prejudice Resulted from the Absence of Empey or
Farrell or the Admission of their Statements.
Even if defendant established any deficiency in counsel's performance, he has not
established prejudice. His ineffectiveness claim, therefore, necessarily fails. See discussion
of standard at 14-15.
There is no basis on this record to presume that if Empey or Farrell had testified, that
either would have provided exculpatory information or would have otherwise contradicted the
prosecution's evidence.

Nor is there any basis to presume that biases, motives, or

inconsistencies, beyond those established by the record, would have been shown if either had
testified. To the contrary, their absence from trial allowed the defense to argue that the jury
should discredit their roles.

statements were testimonial, they were not offered for their truth. See Crawford, 541
U.S. at59n.9.
For similar reasons, the issue of Empey's or Farreli's availability need not be
decided. Though defendant admits that they could be considered unavailable witnesses,
see Br.Aplt. at 26 (citing rule 804, Utah Rules of Evidence), the issue is of no
consequence here because their statements are not testimonial hearsay.
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Similarly, even if their statements had been excluded, other strong, even
overwhelming, evidence established defendant's guilt. See Statement of Facts at 6-9.
Empey's and FarrelPs statements only explained why the officers were at Stimson's and Stop
& Shop actively observing defendant. The statements, however, did not establish the crimes
charged. The requisite elements of defendant's crimes were established only through the
police officers' eyewitness accounts of the two sales and by the physical evidence, which
included the five baggies of heroin sold to Beck, the five identically packaged baggies of
heroin found on Farrell, the pre-recorded $100 bill given to Farrell by Schultz and found
inside defendant's wallet, and the 6.1 grams of heroin found on defendant when arrested. See
id. In sum, regardless of Empey's and Farrell's presence at trial or the admission of their outof-court statements, the outcome here is the same. See Marble, 2007 UT App 82, \ 12
(reaffirming that even when deficient performance is established, prejudice must also be
shown to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
POINTIII
THE CUMULATIVE ERROR DOCTRINE HAS NO APPLICATION
HERE BECAUSE THERE ARE NO MULTIPLE ERRORS AND NO
CUMULATIVE PREJUDICE.
The cumulative error doctrine permits an appellate court to reverse a conviction when
multiple errors are established, that though individually harmless, have the "cumulative
effect" of undermining confidence that a "fair trial was had." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1229. Here,
defendant has established no errors, much less multiple errors. Nor has he shown that absent
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the errors he alleges, there exists a reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial. Id.
at 1208-09. There is, therefore, no basis to apply the cumulative error doctrine.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that the Court affirm
defendant's convictions.
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Addendum

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

A m e n d m e n t VI.

Jury trial for crimes and procedural rights

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.

RULES OF EVIDENCE

R U L E 4 0 3 . EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

R U L E 4 0 4 . CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE
CONDUCT; EXCEPTIONS; OTHER CRIMES
(a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person's character or a
trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of Accused.
Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered
by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a
trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by the accused
and admitted under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of
the accused offered by the prosecution;
(2) Character of Alleged Victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character
of the alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution
to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the
alleged victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence
that the alleged victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of Witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as
provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to sh6w action
in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the
accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in
advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good
cause shown, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
[Amended effective October 1, 1992; February 11, 1998; November 1, 2001.]

RULE 801.

DEFINITIONS

The following definitions apply under this article:
(a) Statement. A "statement'' is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2)
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.
(b) Declarant. A "declarant 0 is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay'' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted.
(d) Statements Which Are Not Hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if:
(1) Prior Statement by Witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or
hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the
statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the witness
denies having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with the
declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge
against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive,
or (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person; or
(2) Admission by Party-Opponent The statement is offered against a party
and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an
adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by
the party to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by
the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the
agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E)
a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
[Amended effective October 1, 1992.]

R U L E 8 0 4 . HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS; DECLARANT UNAVAILABLE
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in which the declarant:
(a)(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from
testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or
(a)(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the
declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so; or
(a)(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's
statement; or
(a)(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or
then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(a)(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the declarant's
statement has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance by process or
other reasonable means.
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if the exemption, refusal, claim of
lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing
of the proponent of the declarant's statement for the purpose of preventing the
witness from attending or testifying.
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule
if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(b)(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of
the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with
law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom
the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor
in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by
direct, cross, or redirect examination.
(b)(2) Statement under belief of impending death. In a civil or criminal action
or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing that the
declarant's death was imminent, if the judge finds it was made in good faith.
(b)(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its
making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or
so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render
invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the
declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be
true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and
offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
(b)(4) Statement of personal or family history. (A) A statement concerning
the declarant's own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, relationship
by blood, adoption or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or
family history, even though the declarant had no means of acquiring personal
knowledge of the matter stated; or (B) a statement concerning the foregoing
matters, and death also, of another person, if the declarant was related to the
other by blood, adoption, or marriage or was so intimately associated with the
other's family as to be likely to have accurate information concerning the
matter declared.
[Amended effective October 1, 1992; November 1, 2004,]

